


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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4 November 1969

State Dept. review completed

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\*North Vietnam: A recent speech by North Vietnam's Party First Secretary Le Duan provides the most explicit evidence to date suggestive of policy differences in the post-Ho leadership.

An "abridged" version of the speech broadcast on 31 October is the first time in two years that Le Duan's views on the war in South Vietnam have been aired in public. Le Duan seems to argue that the war must retain its high priority until Communist objectives are achieved, but his words lack a ring of authority and have a distinctly defensive tone.

Le Duan may be fighting a rear-guard action on behalf of his views. This idea is evident in his plea for party unity. In one passage he noted that divergent views, even between "two comrades in the party," are perfectly normal. He insists, however, that in order to maintain the "collective working system," differences must be discussed and unanimity achieved. It is inadvisable, he says, "to adopt the opinion of one person and force all others to follow it." Such a statement suggests that Le Duan is protesting the emergence of a new party strongman who feels powerful enough to act without taking other leaders' views into account.

Firm conclusions about the North Vietnamese leadership cannot be drawn from this speech alone. It suggests, however, that a serious contest for control of the party has been under way. The other main contestant for power probably is Truong Chinh, the next ranking member of the party politburo, whose views on the war and on domestic policy in North Vietnam seem to have carried the day during the past year. The fact that Le Duan's views have been broadcast, however, suggests that he retains considerable authority and that many policy and leadership questions remain to be decided.

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*\*The Director of The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the Le*

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Duan speech, although an unusual admission of diverging views within the Party, is not a clear indication of the nature of those precise disagreements or of the level at which they exist. There may well be disputes within the Politburo and possibly between Le Duan and Truong Chinh; however, we have no firm knowledge of whether either Le Duan or Truong Chinh has primary responsibility for any specific policy lines.

Neither the Le Duan speech nor the recent Truong Chinh speeches provide evidence that they disagree fundamentally either on domestic issues or on the war in the South. For example, Truong Chinh in his last speech (broadcast October 19), like Le Duan, placed "the anti-US salvation resistance" (the war) ahead of "socialist building" when he listed the "two revolutionary tasks."

Moreover, serious disagreements are not at this time likely to be aired publicly since the Politburo is acutely aware that both the "enemy" and its own rank and file are looking for divisions in the leadership and would prefer not to provide fuel for such speculation. Le Duan's references to such cadre shortcomings as joining the Party for "privileges and special interests," and "abusing power...and damaging the people's interests" strongly suggest that his remarks were intended to apply primarily to the Party level he was in fact addressing, the district cadres of Haiphong's An Thuy District. His stress on the importance of achieving "complete victory" in the South bolsters his case for Party unity and is probably also intended to inspire a war-weary population to make further sacrifices for the war.

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Cambodia: The government's squabble with Prince Sihanouk may be aggravated by Prime Minister Lon Nol's departure for Paris.

Lon Nol left for France last week on a medical leave of absence, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Some observers in Phnom Penh see Lon Nol's medical problems as having political overtones. He may have elected to slip away in order to avoid repercussions from the deteriorating relations between the Chief of State and the cabinet.

In Lon Nol's absence, Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak will head the cabinet. Matak, who has led the government's fight to exert its independence from Sihanouk's interference, has been particularly irritating to the Chief of State. Lon Nol's departure comes at an inopportune time in view of his role as the buffer between Sihanouk and other members of the government. His absence may thus increase friction to the point where the cabinet's tenure is in doubt.


Although the outcome of the current imbroglio is far from certain, at the very least the government's economic reform program could be affected. Sihanouk believes that the government's fiscal and trade policies have aggravated the country's economic problems. The government may have to yield some of its initiative on economic matters in order to avoid a showdown with the prince. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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## Lebanese Tapline Sabotaged After Fighting Ends



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Lebanon: The situation has eased since the cease-fire went into effect on Sunday.

There were no official reports of cease-fire violations yesterday as the Lebanese and fedayeen negotiations move from Cairo to Beirut. Shortly after the fighting came to end, however, Tapline was sabotaged for the second time in a week near the Lebanese port city of Sidon. Fedayeen from the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front reportedly had been planning such an incident.

The Palestinian refugee camps within the country remain a potential danger, although local leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization reportedly are attempting to pacify the militants in the camps. The Lebanese Army, for its part, is trying to increase its manpower. [redacted]

[redacted] over a thousand volunteers have been accepted for immediate military service. [redacted]

(Map)

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Somali Democratic Republic: The Revolutionary Council has finally disclosed its membership and announced the appointment of a 14-man cabinet to head the government ministries.

As expected, the 25-member council is dominated by army officers who hold 20 seats; the remaining five are police officers. Army Commander General Siad is president of the council and also retains responsibility for defense matters. The council has retained control over internal security, local government, and the police.

The civilian members of the cabinet appear to be young, educated, civil servants who have held important posts in the bureaucracy but were not politically involved with past governments. General Korshel, the police commander and a vice president of the council, is in charge of the interior ministry and is the sole military member in the cabinet.

A possibly ominous sign for Somali-Ethiopian relations is the appointment of Omar Arteh Galib to be in charge of foreign affairs. Arteh was formerly ambassador to Ethiopia and is well known for his intense opposition to the detente policy of former prime minister Egal. Although the Ethiopians are concerned over his appointment, the Revolutionary Council itself has made tentative efforts to assure Addis Ababa of its intention to maintain good relations.



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Colombia: The governing National Front's selection of its presidential candidate this week will not be a cut-and-dried affair.

Misael Pastrana's lead in the race for nomination by the Conservative Party convention tomorrow is so slim that deals on behalf of several possible choices reportedly are being prepared. The Liberals, who are partners with the Conservatives in the National Front, will meet on Friday to approve the coalition candidate. An internal power struggle and suspicion of Conservative leader Ospina's intentions will enliven the Liberals' convention.

Leaders of both parties apparently believe that extension of the National Front's "share and share alike" arrangement is best for both. They have agreed on an extensive platform for the next administration, and on Saturday will hold a joint convention to proclaim the candidate and start the campaign for elections to be held on 19 April 1970.


Other presidential candidates are ex-dictator General Rojas Pinilla and maverick Conservative Belisario Betancur, whose candidacy was proclaimed last week by a "popular" Conservative convention. Betancur's endorsement by ex-president Leon Valencia is important but qualified by the latter's own ambitions to return to power if the occasion arises. Betancur has accepted the National Front program, however, and seems determined to try to enter the fray at the regular convention. He has the support of Colombia's largest labor union as well as the students, the Christian Democrats, and other small groups.

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Libya: A mob attack which slightly damaged the US Embassy in Tripoli Sunday appears to have taken Libyan officials by surprise. The attack and a somewhat more serious one on the UK Embassy grew out of an officially encouraged demonstration protesting the 52nd anniversary of the Balfour Declaration which led to the establishment of Israel. Following an official protest by the US chargé, Libyan authorities took security precautions, which are still in force, to prevent a repetition. The incident reflects the intense anti-American and anti-British feeling generated in the Arab world by the allegations of US and UK support for Israel.

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Venezuela: The Central University in Caracas remains quiet, but violence could erupt any time. Government officials decided to order the military to occupy the campus after military leaders said they would do it on their own if the government did not act. Most Venezuelans approve the decision because they are alarmed over the deteriorating political situation caused by the disorder in the congress, university unrest, and the national teacher's strike. There are unconfirmed reports that petroleum workers and the chauffeurs union plan to strike in support of the teachers. Such a sympathy strike could provide extremist student leaders with an opportunity to generate student participation and possible violence. [REDACTED]

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\* \* \* \*

UN - Middle East: The principal debate on the Middle East during the current session of the UN General Assembly will probably arise next week out of the discussion in the special political committee of the work of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Israel's refusal to permit a mass return to the west bank of the Jordan River of persons displaced by the 1967 war is likely to be the Arabs' point of departure for broader commentary. Tel Aviv maintains that the danger of fedayeen infiltration has forced it to limit the return of displaced persons and it will probably cite fedayeen operations from UNRWA camps in Jordan. [REDACTED]

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